Sellars claims completeness for both the “manifest” and the “scientific images” in a way that tempts one to assume that they are independent of each other, while, in fact, they must share at least one common element: the language of individual and community intentions. I argue that this significantly muddies the waters concerning his claim of ontological primacy for the scientific image, though not in favor of the ontological primacy of the manifest image. The lesson I draw is that we (...) need to re-assess the aims of ontology. (shrink)

Almost fifty years ago, Wilfrid Sellars first proposed that psychological concepts are like theoretical concepts. Since then, several different research programs have been based on this conjecture. This essay examines what his original claim really amounted to and what it was supposed to accomplish, and then uses that understanding of the original project to investigate the extent to which the later research projects expand on it or depart from it.

According to H. H. Price, there have been two major approaches to understanding what it is to have a concept: the classical theory and the symbolist theory. The classical theory, whose heritage extends at least to Plato, takes having a concept to be a relation to a special sort of object, usually called a concept or universal. The kind of relation the thinking mind has to this object is most often conceived as analogous to sight, a version of the classical (...) theory which Price calls inspectivism. (shrink)

In order to provide an alternative to the Cartesian myth that knowledge of our thoughts and sensations is "given," Sellars posits a community of "Rylean ancestors" - humans at an early stage of conceptual development who possess a language containing sophisticated concepts about the physical world and about their own language and behavior, but who lack any concepts of thoughts or sensations. Sellars's presentation of this thought experiment leaves many important details sketchy. In the following dialogue, we offer our differing (...) assessments of how well those details could be filled out. TT questions how the Rylean hypothesis could provide a plausible account of human thought and sensory experience at any stage of human conceptual development. WdeV responds to TT's challenge by filling out the picture of what the Ryleans' conceptual world would look like. TT and WdeV debate the merits and the plausibility of the resulting picture. (shrink)

The question is whether Elder can find support for this position in Hegel’s corpus. Elder quickly points to the problematic passages, passages in which Hegel indicates that physical explanations are not applicable to functioning organisms, nor physiological explanations to rational agents as such. According to Elder, however, Hegel can support such a view only if he claims that functional episodes of human behavior do not yield to lower-level explanation, that only the non-functional episodes do. The only support for such a (...) claim Elder can offer is the doctrine of vitalism. But Hegel attacks vitalism quite explicitly. Elder concludes that there is therefore no straightforward answer as to what Hegel’s position really is. He takes heart, however, because we do have reason now for rejecting vitalism, and therefore rejecting the position that episodes of functional human behavior are not amenable to physical or physiological explanation. Thus, he takes Hegel to have sketched a significant and successful response to the mind-body problem. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in a review of a new book about Hegel to remark upon the proliferation of such treatises. Nonetheless, most such books recently have not dealt with Hegel comprehensively, narrowing their consideration instead to a particular theme, a particular text, or both. This is a healthy trend, but it also means that a new book which aims at giving an overview of Hegel’s development and system is still a singular event, especially when it accomplishes its goal as (...) well as Hegel, edited by Otto Pöggeler. The book, written in German and as yet untranslated, is part of a series of introductions to great philosophers published by Karl Alber and is intended to help people without specific knowledge of Hegel gain access and familiarity with his work. Despite these modest intentions, Hegel can also be profitably read by the most erudite Hegel scholar, for it represents in a concise format the state of Hegel scholarship. (shrink)

Hegel’s Philosophy of Action contains the papers from a joint meeting of the Hegel Societies of America and Great Britain held at Oxford in 1981. But it presents an even broader spectrum of Hegel studies, for six different countries are represented.